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When Descartes suggested that
nonhuman animals are machines,
he made formal a view widely taken
for granted by most thinkers in the
Western tradition. In the process,
he conveniently supplied a
rationale for the curious
assumption that only humans have
souls. (Swimming against the tide,
Saint Jerome argued in the early
400s that certain animals might
have small souls.)
Darwin’s theory of evolution by
natural selection licensed a new
take on the problem: the difference
between human and animal
mentality was more likely to be one
of degree. His enthusiastic
followers began to discover that
other species are very clever
indeed. G.J. Romanes, in his
Animal Intelligence (1882) found
thought in virtually every creature
from insects to mammals, but was
especially impressed with primates.
By 1900, the flood of smart-
animal stories reached flood stage.
Theodore Roosevelt and the well-
known writer John Burroughs took
on what they called the Nature
Fakers, who fudged the truth
between fiction and fact. They
mounted a blistering attack, for
instance, on William Long’s story of
a woodcock that set its own
broken leg using a cast made of
mud. During the height of the
debate came a gentle German
schoolmaster and his famous pupil,
Clever Hans. Hans, a Russian
trotting horse, had learned the
rudiments of addition and
subtraction. He was known to read
and spell, compute fractions and
tell time, understand music and
calculate dates. He tapped out
most of his answers, but could also
respond by pointing his nose.
Many notable experts observed
Hans and questioned him with
remarkable success, even in von
Osten’s absence. A panel formally
appointed to investigate concluded
that no trickery could be involved,
but the members were quite
reasonably worried that Hans was
rather too clever. They engaged the
psychologist Oskar Pfungst to
study the horse further. Using a
double-blind technique, Pfungst
discovered that Hans was ‘reading’
the tension in his audience: when
he reached the correct number of
taps, the observers unwittingly
relaxed.
Animals like Hans learn, but what
does this ability to benefit from
experience tell us about cognition?
Does the learning involve
understanding? Ivan Pavlov
stumbled on the apparent key to
this facet of the animal mind in
1903 in the course of his studies of
digestion. He found that, once they
had learned a predictive cue, dogs
would begin salivating for food
before it appeared. The dog
innately recognizes food by an
unconditioned stimulus, US
(probably odor or taste), which
immediately triggers an innate
unconditioned response, UR
(salivation): US→UR. In time, a
previously meaningless
conditioning stimulus (CS),
presented with or just before the
US, comes to release the behavior:
CS+US→UR, then CS→UR. For
Hans, the relaxation of tension had
been the CS. The learning is
automatic: no comprehension is
necessary.
In 1912, J.B. Watson proposed
that all behavior — human or animal
— is compounded of USs, their
URs, and the automatic correlation
process that we now call classical,
or Pavlovian, conditioning. In
Watson’s view, we are the products
of our conditioning, romantically
imagining that we have independent
thought. His school of psychology,
Behaviorism, came to dominate the
study of behavior in the United
States for the next 60 years.
Watson’s idea that novel
behavior was created by chaining
URs together was challenged two
decades later by B.F. Skinner,
who argued that humans and
animals discover new ways of
doing things by trial-and-error
learning. The feedback from an
innately defined goal allows an
automatic correlation process to
fine-tune the animal’s efforts. This
form of learning is ‘operant
conditioning’. Depending on the
behavior studied, both Skinner
and Watson are probably correct
as far as either of these
mechanisms applies.
Behaviorism, then, saw a
difference in degree between
humans and other animals, but in
its ideological desire to rid the
world of instinct, it considered all
animals’ minds to be essentially
identical. Some were simply larger
than others, ours being the biggest
of all. Learning looked the same
from top to bottom, limited only by
sensory equipment and anatomy;
universal rules of learning became
the Holy Grail. At heart, then,
Behaviorism ignored (and implicitly
denied) natural selection’s ability to
create niche-specific minds
designed to solve particular
intellectual challenges.
Beginning about 1920,
ethologists like Lorenz and
Tinbergen started to generalize
about innate behavior observed in
the wild. They realized that animals
generally respond to innate ‘sign
stimuli’ — the USs of Behaviorism,
though ethologists seem never to
have realized this connection —
with equally innate motor programs
or ‘fixed-action patterns’ (the URs).
The responsiveness of an animal to
a particular sign stimulus depends
on the specific drive associated
with the behavior. Whereas
Behaviorists generally used hunger
or punishment as motivators,
ethologists focussed on more
natural and less extreme drives,
like the ones associated with
pairing, nest building, incubation,
care of the young, and so on.
Ethologists saw in nature what
they took to be a different kind of
learning, subject to some degree of
innate control. A key example is
parental imprinting, in which a
young animal learns to recognize
its parents as individuals, distinct
from other members of the species,
a process triggered by a few sign
stimuli. Other examples of learning
also seemed to be innately guided:
hunting wasps, for instance,
memorize landmarks around the
burrow entrance only as they leave;
they concentrate on three-
dimensional objects, and
completely ignore a host of readily
detected potential CSs. Like
Behaviorists, most ethologists saw
animals as machines; the two
schools disagreed violently,
however, on how these machines
worked and the role of evolution in
learning.
The Behaviorist world view of
animals as mindless learning
machines was shaken by four
telling sets of studies. The first was
Wolfgang Köhler’s work on
chimpanzees in 1915–17. Köhler
reported numerous examples of
spontaneous problem solving by
his wild-caught animals, but an
equally curious inability to focus on
and perfect solutions. It is almost
as though his chimps suffered from
attention-deficit disorder. When
Paul Schiller repeated this work on
lab-reared chimpanzees in the late
1940s, he found that the crucial
ingredient for problem solving was
play: the animal must have had an
opportunity to play with objects
and discover their possibilities as
tools before the problem was
presented. Köhler’s chimps had
enjoyed weeks of exposure to the
various boxes and sticks they later
used to reach bananas. Schiller
also discovered that, regardless of
experience, chimpanzee expect
boxes to stick to walls and remain
balanced in any position the animal
chooses to put them in.
The problem this work posed for
Behaviorists was twofold: there is
no reason for animals to play (no
tangible reward), and no way for an
animal designed along their lines to
put together two or more
experiences from other contexts to
solve a novel problem. The next
bombshell came from E.C. Tolman,
who found exactly the same thing
in rats — the official lab animal of
Behaviorism. Tolman’s rats fused
two unreinforced experiences to
solve a maze problem. In the late
1940s Tolman coined the term
‘cognitive map’ to describe this
primitive ability to plan.
The third major shock came in
1966 when John Garcia discovered
rapid food-avoidance conditioning.
This kind of one-trial learning
violates many of the rules of
classical conditioning: the cues
that can be learned are strictly
limited, the association is not
forgotten or reversible, and the UR
can follow the CS+US experience
by many hours. Suddenly the link
between imprinting and classical
conditioning became clear:
learning can be controlled by
instinct. Subsequent work revealed
a host of such sensory biases in
rats and pigeons, and then similar
prejudices in operant conditioning
in the same species. In most cases,
these ‘anomalies’ seem to focus
the animal’s attention on the cues
or body parts most likely to be
relevant to the learning task at
hand. Clearly natural selection
should favor such biases if they
tend to make the learning quicker
and more reliable, and this is just
the sort of innate guidance
ethologists had been reporting for
decades.
The final blow came in 1976 with
David Olton’s work on rats in eight-
arm mazes. He showed that his
animals create mental maps of the
maze as they explore it, and can
refer back to these unreinforced
experiences days later. Indeed, a
consistent pattern of having
underestimated the mental powers
of lab animals emerges from the
studies that have followed. In one
example, mice were allowed
unreinforced inspection of an
unbelievably complex maze, which
required more than 1200 correct
turns to solve efficiently. All mice,
for no apparent reason, were
running this path perfectly within
three days. Or to take another case
(discussed more later), pigeons
were able to learn the concept of
‘tree’ faster than the distinction
between two very different colors.
In the same year, a deeply
subversive book by Donald Griffin
appeared: The Question of Animal
Awareness. For more than 60 years
this topic had been off limits, and
most of us had forgotten that there
even was such a question. The
response was mostly one of
outrage and shock, but within a
few years Griffin’s continuing
salvoes had generated
considerable interest, reinspection
and analysis of old data, and new
experiments. By the time of his
death in 2003, Griffin had created a
vigorous new field of animal
behavior — one which is now so
crowded with evidence that some
of us have begun to wonder if
animals are not, once again, in
danger of being thought too clever.
One of the problems endemic to
research on animal cognition is the
ability of natural selection to create
behavior of astonishing complexity
and suitability to a problem. For
instance, so far as we know, all
bird nests are built on the basis of
innate instructions: a ‘to-do’ list
specifying construction materials
and methods. True, birds typically
get better with experience, but an
attempt to create a bird’s nest by
hand will convince anyone that the
amount of trial-and-error learning
needed to do the job even badly
requires far too much valuable time
in the breeding season.
So when an animal does
something apparently clever, the
first question to ask is whether this
might be part of its natural
repertoire. Is the intelligence
genuine — an ability to create a
novel solution in the mind — or is it
a trick being played on an all-too-
gullible audience of humans? The
answer requires knowing the
natural history of the species, and
(ideally) what behaviors emerge
spontaneously without experience. 
Two examples illustrate this
problem. Chimpanzees in the wild
are sometimes seen using sticks or
blades of grass to ‘fish’ termites
from mounds, often with the young
looking on. But our knowledge that
lab-reared chimps spontaneously
push long, thin objects (like
pencils) into holes (such as
electrical outlets) casts a new light
on the likely origin of the behavior:
the poking is spontaneous, and the
food reward focuses the effort on
mounds. Even the apparently
attentive youngsters gathered
round may only be learning where
to experiment; this process, known
as ‘local enhancement’, discredited
most previously accepted
examples of animal ‘teaching’.
Or consider the famous case of
cream robbing by blue tits in 1930s
Britain. The birds learned to peel
back the lids from unhomogenized
milk left on doorsteps in the early
morning hours, to consume the
cream. While this was widely
interpreted at the time as evidence
of insight, a little knowledge of the
natural history of blue tits suggests
what really happened: These birds
make their living peeling back tree
bark to find and eat the fat-rich
larvae of insects. So compulsive is
this peeling behavior that hand-
reared blue tits allowed to fly about
indoors will strip the paper off walls
in search of food. Peeling back the
lid of the milk bottle is as likely to
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have been habit as genius; the
subsequent spread of the behavior
is probably an example of local
enhancement.
One suggestion for measuring
animal intelligence is to look at
learning rates or memory capacity.
But the numbers tell us that some
animals must be smarter than
humans at certain tasks. For
instance, a human can remember
perhaps a dozen places he has
hidden food, whereas various
caching birds regularly memorize
hundreds or even thousands of
locations. Or if we ask how many
trials are needed to achieve an
80% success rate on a two-color
discrimination task, we find that
goldfish need 4 exposures,
pigeons 10, rats 22, and five-
month-old humans 28; honey bees
require 2 trials. Clearly the idea that
brain size and learning are
correlated has no predictive value
on these measures for these
commonly tested species.
Or consider mental rotation, a
component of human ‘intelligence’
tests — one on which men do
substantially better than women. A
look at the data reveals that the
time required to decide if a
particular figure is a rotation of
another depends on the angle of
rotation (up to 180°). Pigeons also
recognize rotated figures, but their
response time does not depend on
angle; clearly the ability is
hardwired in that species. Honey
bees, too, can match rotated
figures with little delay. Here again,
we are faced with an apparent
superiority of other species; clearly,
some ‘cognitive’ abilities are wired
in, and may even differ between
the sexes of a single species.
Students of animal cognition
must grapple with this question of
what behaviors are really
intelligent, knowing that what may
be innate for us may require mental
effort in another species, and vice
versa. The ideal behavior for
experimental purposes would be
one that shows little evidence of
species specialization — a
behavior that is not part of the
normal repertoire, but must be
invented de novo to solve a novel
problem. The behavior must also
require something that goes
beyond the mechanical operation
of conditioning. There are several
potential examples of thinking in
animals that seem to meet these
criteria, at least at first glance.
During concept formation, for
example, an animal must
generalize from specific instances
to a list of features probabilistically
associated with the concept in
question. Consider a generic ‘tree’:
it is usually green, with a central
trunk, spreading branches, and so
on. But in every case, we can think
of exceptions. We recognize trees
because we unconsciously come
to know these association
probabilities. Richard Herrnstein
showed that lab-reared pigeons
readily learn to recognize the
concept of tree. That they did so
after only 25 reinforced (concept-
positive) and 25 unreinforced
(concept-negative) slides is
amazing: pigeons require many
more trials to learn what seem to
us much simpler distinctions.
The subsequent discovery that
even honey bees spontaneously
form concepts, however, has taken
much of the force from this work.
Edward Wasserman accounts for
concept formation as an extension
of classical conditioning, which is
not unreasonable if we assume
that the association probabilities —
both negative and positive — of
dozens of factors can be
processed simultaneously. This is
just what neural-net models
assume, and here, finally, may be
some reason to take them
seriously. Selection should
certainly have favored concept
formation in many species; the fact
that it is so widespread a feature
suggests that animals may be
programmed to look for more
information than experimenters are
in the habit of providing. If so, not
only is concept formation not
particularly cognitive, but we have
been inadvertently making animals
look stupid.
The route planning that Tolman
uncovered and Olton made famous
is another ability that may look
more impressive than it is. Most of
us can close our eyes and
reconstruct the direction to an
unseen target, or devise in our
heads a novel and indirect route.
So too, it would seem, can
chimpanzees, dogs, rats and many
birds. What is necessary is a
knowledge of the surroundings,
and useful landmarks to tell you
where you are when the problem
needs to be solved. But these
abilities all map to a small area of
the hippocampus in mammals,
which suggests a piece of
dedicated circuitry for this
important class of behavior. Honey
bees and hunting spiders are at
least as good as many vertebrates.
It is not hard to imagine a built-in
program for making and using
maps, while it is difficult to think of
a way of disproving this alternative
(or of some compelling reason
natural selection would not have
created such wiring).
Examples of apparent invention
in nature bring us closer to animal
intelligence: they are rare, but all
the more remarkable (and less
likely to be hard-wired). For
instance, the practice of using bait
to lure fish has been discovered by
a handful of herons in widely
separated parts of the globe.
Bernd Heinrich hand-reared a
group of ravens and then
confronted them with a series of
novel problems involving meat
suspended from a branch by a
piece of string. Initial attempts to
snatch the meat on the wing were
unsuccessful, and the birds
eventually stopped trying. Later,
with no preamble, one bird flew to
the branch, reached down and
pulled up the string, stepped on it,
pulled up some more, and so on
until it had the food. 
Some (but not all) of the other
birds subsequently solved the
problem (apparently independently)
in slightly different ways. This
ability to devise a behavioral
solution in the mind before
applying the strategy in the real
world — what I call mental trial-
and-error — seems a key piece of
evidence for thinking. If we know
the natural history of the species
and the past experience of the
individuals, it is difficult to think of
an explanation that does not
involve understanding — and
follow-up tests with stones and
crossed strings seem to confirm
this view for the ravens.
Another kind of behavior that
seems to impress our species is
abstract reasoning. When David
Premack’s chimps solve problems
involving proportions or cause-
and-effect sequences, we sense
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something cognitively familiar.
Premack notes that only chimps
trained to use a token-based
language could solve these
problems. While any thinking or
planning the ravens accomplished
must have involved manipulating
mental images, it is possible that
having learned to use ‘words’
made reasoning easier for the
chimps. If so, that would help
explain why the parrots Irene
Pepperberg trained to use words
for objects and their properties
seem so convincing — more so
when observed in real time than
when described on paper. Alex the
parrot has just that degree of delay
and hesitancy we associate with
thinking. He can select an object
with a novel combination of
features in response to verbal
questions, count and name the
same/different features of a new
pair of objects.
Language use is also of interest
to cognitive ethology. But human
language has enormous innate
help in the form of drive, sign
stimuli and brain organization.
There is no reason to think parrots,
sea lions, dolphins or chimpanzees
enjoy any of these advantages;
nevertheless, all four species can
learn to decode (and in the case of
chimps, encode) simple word-
order sentences. This capacity to
abstract cause-and-effect
relationships may build on innate
abilities to decipher how the world
works, but that these animals can
learn an alien language at all is
deeply thought provoking.
While we may question the
ultimate cognitive importance of
language as more than a tool,
certain spontaneous displays of
human-like behavior seem easier
to read. Perhaps the most
impressive of these involve
apparent self knowledge or self
awareness. Most of us have seen
birds attacking their reflection in
windows, or dogs and cats
ignoring their mirror images; they
just don’t seem to ‘get it’.
Dolphins, gorillas and
chimpanzees, on the other hand,
soon learn to treat the mirror (or
video camera) as a tool for
inspecting themselves (especially
bodily orifices and unusual
marks); particularly with cameras,
the behavior is strikingly similar to
that of humans in shopping malls.
It is easy to interpret this behavior
as showing self awareness, an
ability we unquestioningly assume
is cognitive; oddly enough, the
pioneer of this approach, George
Gallup, is not impressed.
Perhaps the most convincing
cases of self awareness involve
deceit. Lying seems to imply an
understanding of the state of mind
of another individual, a deliberate
attempt to manipulate that creature
based on acquired knowledge
about him and what he knows, all
in an effort to create a novel
outcome. There is an endless
series of anecdotes involving
chimpanzees: singly unconvincing
perhaps, but difficult to ignore
when taken together. My favorite
involves a low-ranking chimp
named Dandy, studied by Frans de
Waal. Dandy developed a number
of ruses for fooling higher-ranking
males in an effort to keep food for
himself or copulate with females.
Most seem obvious examples of
intentional deceit — lying soon
recognized for what it was by the
other males. 
Perhaps the best example of
Dandy’s devious mind involves an
incident in which he discovered his
‘special’ female copulating with
another low-ranking male: rather
than throwing a fit (a typical
response to aggravating or
frustrating experiences), Dandy
cold-bloodedly set off to bring a
high-ranking male to see what was
happening, and left it to this stooge
to punish his rival. (With such
machinations, involving forming
coalitions followed by complex
doublecrosses, Dandy rose to the
top of his troop.)
Examples of animals apparently
‘reading’ the minds of their fellows
are so far restricted to primates.
Dorothy Cheney and Robert
Seyfarth, for instance, have
demonstrated that every member
of a vervet troop understands the
dominance rank and kinship bonds
of every other member, and uses
that information to guide behavior.
On a much more restricted scale,
however, even chickens evaluate
their audience before deciding to
produce alarm calls.
Perhaps the most even-handed
thing that can be said about
cognitive ethology is that it has
made animals look smarter and
humans dumber than either group
formerly appeared. Individual
opinion differs on where to draw
the line on thinking, but it seems
clear that much of what we once
took to be cognitive and largely
human now appears to be
widespread and at least partially
innate. The power of automatic
learning (in humans as well as
animals) is much greater than we
had thought, while evolution
seems to have smoothed the path
to abilities once considered
intellectually impressive. 
Designing convincing tests
requires knowing the natural
history of a species, and the
individual experience of each
animal to be tested. Solving what
are for the species and individual
novel problems seems the best
guide to animal thinking (and the
most fruitful area of current
research). The use of language or
real-time TV images as tools, or
guile as a strategy, are equally
impressive windows into the
animal mind, but this approach is
limited to a narrow group of
species — dolphins and apes.
Niche challenges are especially
critical in choosing animals for
study and problems to offer:
evolutionary necessity seems to
have been the mother of cognitive
invention; species that face
frequent unpredictable challenges
in nature are the ones in which a
compensating ability to think and
plan is most likely to have
evolved.
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